USA v. Hamlin by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-16-2012 
USA v. Hamlin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Hamlin" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 993. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/993 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
                               
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4650 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARIO HAMLIN, 
 
Appellant. 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00181-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
        
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 27, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: May 16, 2012) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge
 
: 
 In this appeal, we must determine whether a criminal defendant sentenced after the 
enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) for crimes committed before that 
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date should be sentenced under the more lenient terms of the FSA.  As explained below, 
we have already concluded that the FSA must be applied in such a situation. 
 On July 8, 2010, Mario Hamlin pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution and 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Count I 
was based on a transaction on January 16, 2008, in which Hamlin sold 48.9 grams of 
crack cocaine to a confidential source who was working with the Drug Enforcement 
Agency.  Count II was based on a transaction that occurred approximately two weeks 
later on January 31, 2008, in which Hamlin sold 65.3 grams of crack cocaine to the same 
source. 
 At that time, penalties for Hamlin’s offenses were controlled by the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006).  Under that law, a conviction for an 
offense, involving at least fifty grams of a substance containing cocaine base, required  a 
mandatory minimum prison sentence of ten years, § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).  On August 3, 
2010, Congress changed this sentencing scheme through the FSA in order to address a 
disparity between sentences for crimes such as Hamlin’s that involved crack cocaine and 
those that involved powdered cocaine.  See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010).  As a result, under the FSA, an amount of at 
least 280 grams of a substance containing cocaine base was required to trigger the 
mandatory minimum ten-year sentence.  Hamlin’s offenses involved less than 280 grams.  
 When Hamlin subsequently appeared for sentencing on December 3, 2010, he and 
the government did not agree whether this statutory change affected his case.  Hamlin 
argued that the FSA controlled any sentence imposed after its enactment, but the 
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government maintained that it did not.  Although the District Court noted that, without 
the 10-year mandatory minimum, it would probably have sentenced Hamlin at the low 
end of the Sentencing Guidelines’ seventy to eighty-seven month range, the court 
adopted the government’s position and sentenced Hamlin to ten years in prison.1
Hamlin now appeals, arguing that the District Court’s application of a ten-year 
mandatory minimum to Count II was inappropriate in light of the changes effectuated by 
the FSA.
   
2
We will, therefore, vacate the judgment of sentence and remand this case to the 
District Court for resentencing under the FSA. 
  We agree.  We recently held in United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 
2011), that the FSA applies to any sentence imposed after its August 3, 2010, enactment 
regardless of when the underlying crime was committed.  Because Hamlin was sentenced 
on December 3, 2010, the court should have sentenced him pursuant to the FSA.   
                                              
1 Specifically, Hamlin was sentenced to 120 months in prison “at both Count I and Count 
II,” to be served concurrently, a five-year term of supervised release and a $200 
mandatory assessment.  
 
2 We have jurisdiction over Hamlin’s appeal on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our 
review is plenary.  See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2010). 
